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Abstract 
The growth of alternative trading systems that compete with established stock markets 
will have profound effects on many securities exchanges and their member firms. New 
screen-based markets can match buy and sell orders, and confirm trades electronically to 
the participants. In many cases, investors' orders meet directly in the system without the 
involvement of a broker or a dealer, saving intermediation costs such as the bid-ask 
spread and broker commission costs. competing market makers operating on the London 
Stock Exchange's SEAQ market system provide an intermediated, "quote-driven" trading 
mechanism. Nearly all equities trading in London today occurs through SEAQ, but the 
approaching roll-out of several alternative trading systems will provide investors with new 
o~portunities to trade without market makers. A simulation model of order arrival, infor- 
mation change, and trading in a competing dealer market based on the London Stock 
Exchange is used to examine the consequences of disintermediated trading systems. The 
results indicate that trading by market makers at their discretion at "midspread" prices 
leads to a significant reduction in dealing margins. In two other scenarios, the operation 
of an alternative, disintermediated order crossing mechanism, reduces market makers' 
trading volumes and lowers the level of intermediation at some savings to investors. 
Alternative trading systems reduce transactions costs borne by some traders, but those 
requiring immediate execution and dealer intermediation may pay more. 
Introduction. Two important and controversial trends affecting securities markets are the 
growth of passive fund management, and the emergence of alternative market mechanisms that 
compete for order flow with established exchanges. In many cases, screen-based trading systems 
allow investors' orders to meet directly without the involvement of a broker or a dealer, saving 
bid-ask spread costs and broker commissions. Because these systems can reduce trade execution 
costs, index and quantitative fund managers in the U.S. and elsewhere are using them more 
actively. However, disintermediated trading mechanisms often delay trade execution and do not 
guarantee that submitted orders will be completed. Supporters:point out that the new trading 
* To Appear: Stock Exchange Quarterly and Quality of Markets Review, London Stock Exchanse, Summer 
Edition 1994. 
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systems introduce additional competition, reduce trading costs, and give institutional fund 
managers greater flexibility in trading. Critics argue that these systems often lack liquidity and 
impose price risks because investors' orders may not execute immediately. To analyze these 
arguments, we developed a simulation model of order arrival and trading in a competing dealer 
market based on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) SEAQ market. The model is used to 
examine the effects of low-cost investor trading activity, and to compare outcomes when passive 
trade orders are routed to: 
a SEAQ market makers who execute orders at the middle price (the average 
of the best bid and offer quotes) when an order does not increase their 
position further beyond their position limits, or 
a an alternative trading system that crosses offsetting buy and sell orders at 
the middle price three times a day 
The results highlight the potential for trading cost reductions in alternative trading 
systems. However, passive crossing systems have several drawbacks and can impose costs on 
users. We identify disadvantages that partly offset the benefits predicted by "electronic markets' 
research (Malone, et al., 1987; Bakos, 1991) and securities market disintermediation proponents 
(Peake, Mendelson, and Williams, 1979; Schwartz, 1989). Although investors can significantly 
reduce their transactions costs by seeking midspread trade executions, achieving savings in the 
alternative trading system however requires a "critical mass" of activity to develop. Opposing 
that could be a pattern of market maker response that inhibits activity on a disintermediated 
system. By sacrificing some of their dealing margins and trading aggressively with passive 
traders at "midspread" prices, market makers may retain order flow from investors who would 
then find little advantage from the trading system. The model also identifies "selection costs" 
from using a crossing system; orders that do not complete often pay more than they would have 
paid to execute immediately with a market maker. Finally, we find that market makers have 
incentives to submit position-balancing orders to the crossing system. The added orders, 
however, have the effect of raising the proportion of submitted orders that execute, making the 
system more attractive to investors seeking to bypass the dealers. Although crossing systems 
are in an embryonic stage of development, their adoption is likely to be rapid, and the 
performance of market participants unprepared for the consequences is likely to deteriorate. 
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Investment management changes. New approaches to investment management are emerging, 
and the changes are pressuring market intermediaries and securities exchanges to adapt. 
Investors' trading needs are an outgrowth of their investment technique. Most active fund 
managers feel they distinguish themselves on the basis of stock selection, with low trading cost 
a secondary consideration. Discussing trading techniques, an active fund manager in London 
noted "we are not worried about the odd lp  or 2p [in trading costs]." (in Clemons and Weber, 
1992) Active managers' trades demand greater immediacy and capitdl commitment from market 
makers. The current LSE market structure provides the greatest support for investors that 
initiate trades and pay for member firms' brokerage and market making services. 
Indexation and model-driven quantitative investing are growing responses to many active fund 
managers' underperformance relative to market indexes. 
A survey' in 1990 of 36 of the largest U,S. pension funds with assets totaling $259 
billion found 34% of their domestic equities holdings were indexed, up from 30% in 
1986 
A 1994 LSE internal survey of 29 U.K fund managers found that 12% of their £290 
billion under management was invested passively 
Passive strategies require low-cost trading, and do not demand immediate execution of trading 
orders as provided by the SEAQ market makers. One of the largest pension fund managers in 
the U.S. pointed out that 
"the lion's share of our trading now is over electronic systen.rs, and if r-ve had to 
payfi.11 freight (about 5-10 cents per share) we would not do the trades. Our 
commission is at most 2 cents per share this way, and if i f  were 5 cen.rs the 
portfolio strategy rvould be unpro$rable. " (in Clemons and Weber, 1992) 
To avoid paying for immediate execution and market makers' capital, passive traders advertise 
their buy and sell interests, but do not initiate trades. A managing director of a major 
institutional brokerage house in New York remarked that "institutions are so cost-conscious 
they'll bypass the [New York Stock Exchange] floor and us anyway they can to trade directly 
Committee on Investment of Employee Benefits, "Survey of Pension Fund Investment Practices", Financial 
Executives Institute, Morristown, NJ, 1990. 
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with each other." A survey2 of 150 U.S. fund managers with $1,500 billion under management 
found that: 
46% of respondents delayed trades over time to obtain a price more 
favorable than the current market price 
While investors are willing to balance cost and trading immediacy, they also recognize the risk 
of delaying trade executions: 
55 % found the "opportunity costs of missing a price" the most important 
cost they face in trading compared to 41 % for "market impact" and 4% 
for "commissions" 
New trading mechanisms. With investors' trading needs exhibiting growing variation, any one 
market system is less likely to be suited to any investor's strategy. Increasingly, institutions 
regard the selection of a trading mechanism as a way to enhance investment performance. Two 
electronic crossing networks - The Crossing Network and Posit - were introduced in the U.S. 
in 1986 and 1987 as alternatives for passive traders to bypass the established exchanges. Posit 
has been more successful, and in the second quarter of 1994 executed 9.1 milIion shares a day 
on average up from 6.3 million in the second quarter of 1993. For comparison, daily volumes 
in the second quarter of 1993 and 1994 on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were 252 
million and 269 million shares. Posit operates three daily crossings in  which offsetting buy and 
sell orders are matched at the average of the existing bid and offer prices from the NYSE. 
,The NYSE's specialist-led floor market has suffered a significant loss of market share 
in the trading of its listed stocks to Posit and other alternative trading mechanisms. The NYSE's 
share of trading volume has fallen from 88 percent in 1980 to 79 percent in 1993. Including the 
volume of U.S. stocks now traded overseas and not reported, the current NYSE share of trading 
volume is about 70 percent. In contrast, off-exchange systems in London have languished. 
Ariel, an inter-institutional trading system, was introduced in the U.K. in 1974. Activity on 
Ariel never reached a significant level, and it was soon phased out. Since 1987, Instinet has 
provided a facility for disintermediated trading, but its activity levels in the U.K. have been low 
Economide~, N. and Schwartz, R. "Equity Trading Practices and Market Structure", New York University 
and Institutional Investor Trader Forum, 1994. 
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in comparison to the U.S., where it trades about 20 million shares a day mostly of NASDAQ 
stocks. Currently, nearly all equities trading in London occurs through SEAQ market makers. 
The recent introduction of U.K. versions of successful U.S. off-exchange trading systems, and 
. 
the approaching roll-out of TradePoint will provide institutions with additional opportunities to 
trade without SEAQ market makers. 
An order' flow and trading model. Missing in the controversy about low-cost fund 
management and off-exchange trading systems have been controlled studies of their effects on 
market participants and market quality. We developed a model of trading in a single, 
representative equity, and analyze it under ceteris paribus order flow conditions using computer 
simulation. Simulation is a widely used technique in engineering and management science. 
Commercial software is available, and the model is implemented in PC SIMSCRIPT 11.5 from 
the CACI Products Company. 
We use the model to look at three scenarios. In Scenario I, we increase from 0% to 60% 
the proportion of institutional-size liquidity orders (defined below) that will seek to trade with 
SEAQ dealers at the current middle price. In this scenario, institutional clients, aware of 
TradePoint and other low-cost trading facilities, will offer business to their customary market 
makers at middle prices. We assume that a market maker receiving a midspread order will 
execute it against his inventory at the middle price unless his position in the stock is beyond the 
position limit (a predetermined multiple of Normal Market Size) and to be enlarged by the 
arriving order. In the latter case,-the market maker will still deal, but at the SEAQ touch bid 
or offer. In Scenario 11, an alternative trading mechanism is added to the model to assess, 
again, the impact of midspread trading on the market and on market makers, and the additional 
effect of a periodic crossing system. The crossing system accepts investors' orders and matches 
the offsetting quantity three times a day at the current middle price from the SEAQ market. 
Unexecuted orders remain in the system for a day, and are sent to a market maker after their 
b 
third unsuccessful crossing. In Scenario 111, market makers participate by submitting their 
excess inventories into the crossing. Note that in Scenarios I1 and 111, the midspread trading 
mechanism could be an off-exchange system, or a system offered by the established exchange. 
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Components of the market model. Trading in the model is the result of machine-generated 
order flow interacting with the programmed decision rules of market maker intermediaries. A 
number of assumptions are made about the arrival process of investors' orders, random walk 
changes to the "fair value" (p*) at which buy and sell order arrival rates are equal, and the 
proportion of investors seeking to reduce transactions costs by trading at the middle price. The 
model is based on theoretical research in financial economics (Mendelson, 1987), operational 
details of the SEAQ market (Clemons and Weber, 1990), the author's collaboration with the 
Director of Equities Operations of a London-based securities firm, and interviews with 
experienced traders at other firms. 
Market makers buy and sell securities based on their quoted bid and offer prices, and build 
positions that absorb transient fluctuations in investor buying and selling. These imbalances 
might otherwise lead to more volatile changes in market prices. In the model, dealers do not 
speculate by taking long-term positions, but seek to maintain an essentially flat book (zero 
position in the security). The dealers do not know the value of p*, and change their quoted 
prices in response to their inventory, the observable order flow, and other market maker actions. 
Order arrival and trading. Investors' orders amve according to a stochastic Poisson process3 
with an expected arrival rate of 21.3 orders per hour. Based on the dealers' market shares and 
whether they are making the touch bid or offer, arriving orders are allocated to a specific market 
maker. Consistent with preferencing, a dealer not making the inside quote has a smaller (but 
non-zero) probability of receiving a customer order.4 The normal ratio of buy orders to sell 
orders is 1: 1, although this will increase to 2: 1 whenever p* is greater than the lowest offer 
(infomed buying), or p* is below the highest bid (informed selling). In addition, the model 
accounts for the evidence that market prices follow more run patterns than predicted by a 
random process by including momenrum orders. In actual markets, momentum trading could 
result from "chartists" inferring short-term price trends from one-sided trade activity, or from 
Statistical goodness-of-fit tests using time-stamped trade report data from the LSE indicate that the Poisson 
arrival process is justified for capturing typical order arrival behavior. (Weber, 1991) 
In a sample of LSE trading from July 1989, the market maker(s) quoting the touch price for a stock 
received only 41.3 percent of the incoming trading orders (Clemons and Weber, 1992). 
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traders who infer that successive trades on one side of the spread presage price movement. In 
the SEAQ market, the adage is "blue makes buyers and red makes sellers." When the number 
of consecutive bid-side trade prices and midtouch quote declines (a sell run) is five or more, the 
ratio of sell orders to buy orders will increase to 8 5 .  A buy run is equivalently defined. About 
four percent of the order flow in the model comes from such trend traders. To reflect 
improvements on the SEAQ touch quotes5, when the touch is 5p or wider, trades for more than 
5 units (institutional size) will execute l p  above the bid if selling, or l p  below the offer if 
buying. 
Order sizes. In the simulation, buy and sell orders submitted to the market vary in size from 
1 to 25 units. This convenient normalization means that a un i t  represents shares with a value 
o f f  10,000. Hence the range of orders considered is from £ 10,000 to £250,000. Trades of this 
size account for about 65 percent of total value of LSE bargains. Beyond 25 units, we assume 
the trade would be handled as a negotiated block trade, or arrive in the market in smaller 
broken-up pieces. The average order size in the model is 7 units, or £70,000. In 1993, the 
average bargain value in FTSE-100 stocks was £68,905. On the basis of its fit with empirical 
data from the London Stock Exchange's Quality of Markets data, the Beta distribution was 
selected for order sizes in the simulation (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 : SIMULATION ORDER SIZE DISTRIBUTION 
Order Size in Simulation (Units) . 
The Stock Exchange Quarrerly, Spring 1994, reported that 35 percent of all U.K. equity bargains occur 
inside the touch bid and ask quotes. 
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In Figures 2a and 2b, the model and market maker operations are illustrated over a 100 
hour period. We consider a stock with a mean time between orders of about 3 minutes, and set 
its initial equilibrium value at £4.00. Market makers revise their quotes over time to reflect 
changes to their inventory positions. Figure 2a's left vertical axis is in  units of pounds sterling 
and reflects the touch bid and ask, and p*. The touch bid and ask quotes track p* subject to 
some lag and some overshooting. The left vertical axis in Figure 2b represents the market-to 
market value of the market makers' inventory, and the market makers' aggregate dealing 
revenues. An initial p* of £4.00 is used, and dealers' spreads are 1.5 percent. As represented 
by the two thin lines, the initial touch is £3.97 bid and £4.03 offered. Once trading begins, the 
dealers' inventory value rises to over 400 in the first few hours, which causes the dealers to 
adjust their quotes 3p-4p downward. The dealers' positions return to zero, and then become 
short. After about 10 hours of trading the touch offer falls below p* (Figure 2a). At that point, 
the touch bid and ask no longer straddle p*. The low ask quote triggers informed buving. The 
ratio of buy orders to sell orders rises from 1: 1 to 2: 1. Between hours 10 and 20, growing short 
positions force the dealers to raise their quotes. After about 20 hours, p* falls from £4.00 to 
£3.85. With the touch bid greater than p*, the market makers positions become very long, 
forcing downward quote revisions and a price "freefall" between hour 20 and 30. At hour 43, 
the p* increases to £4.07 leading to a buying imbalance and growing short positions for the 
market makers. After 100 hours, the market makers have aggregate profits of 34.0 currency 
units or about a 5 basis points dealing margin on turnover of 62,000 currency units. 
FIGURES 2~ AND 2 ~ :  MODEL ILLUSTRATIONS 
(a) Randoin walk of p*, market touch bid and ask @) Dcaling revenues, midprier, inventory value 
3.70 4 I -60 -1 1x70 
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 
Tndlng Houn Tradlng Houn 
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Simulation scenarios. In the first of three scenarios, midspread orders are routed to market 
makers, who execute them at their discretion. Unless the order is to sell and the market maker 
is long beyond his position limit (or the order is to buy and his inventory position is short 
beyond his position limit), the order will execute at the middle price, which can be in half- 
pennies. If the market maker does not accommodate the midspread order, he executes it at the 
SEAQ touch quote. Since other orders will execute l p  inside the touch quote, a midspread order 
that is turned down executes at a less attractive price. The experimental design varies the 
midspread-seeking trading proportion of the large order flow (6 units or more) from zero in the 
base case to 60 percent. Scenarios I, 11, and 111 are illustrated in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3: SCHEMATIC OF TRADING FLOWS IN THREE SCENARIOS 
Two-sided 
order flow: 
( 3Ci'min. before / I 
order flow: Sce $ p" <&, I '8‘2enarios 11 One-sided 
Informed . \,% 
buy if p*>ask '".% \... 
sell if p*<bid 
*omenturn 
buy in uptrends . ,. \ s %. \ Excess positions 
'., ....',.., 
I., r sell in downtrends :: .. . .:, in Scenario 111 
'-. 4 7  
I 
, . 
1 1  
c o
Ill
.. . 
.. . 
,.', 
'\ Scenarios 11 and 111 (30 mi". before crossing) 
\ .-------.....-....-----. .-- -.-..-----.. -.------.-- 
In the second and third scenarios, an alternative trading mechanism is introduced. The 
disintermediated mechanism is a periodic crossing system that matches offsetting buy and sell 
orders according to time priority at the mid-touch price. It enables midspread orders to be 
entered anonymously and crossed, thus bypassing SEAQ market makers. Crossings are 
conducted three times a day: at 1 1 : loam, 1 :50pm, and 4:30pm. The experimental design again 
3 
tries 
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varies the proportion of the large order flow that is for midspread trading from 7.5 percent to 
60 percent. All midspread orders are entered into the system, and in the last half hour before 
the crossing time, the given proportion (7.5 %, 15 %, 30%, 45 %, 60%) of all other incoming 
orders for six or more units will go to the crossing system. All other orders are routed to a 
market maker. Non-midspread orders that are entered participate in  only one crossing, and if 
unexecuted are routed to a SEAQ market maker for execution just after the crossing. Although 
an average FTSE 100 stock has 17 market makers, most dealers are fairly inactive, hence only 
six are used in the simulation. Otherwise, the input variables were chosen to reflect a typical 
stock in the FTSE 100. In the second scenario, midspread orders are routed to an investor-only 
crossing system that matches buy and sell orders three times daily. In the third scenario, market 
makers can use the order crossing system, and enter orders for their excess inventory positions. 
For instance, a dealer with a position limit of 14 that is long 25 units, will enter an order to sell 
11 units. The model's input parameter settings are listed in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
Model Tnput Parameter 
Mean order arrival rate 
Arrival rate ratio: Buy:Sells 
when p* > Touch Ask 
when p* < Touch Bid 
Standard deviation of daily return of p* 
Expected time between p* changes 
Trading day length 
Initial fair value price 
Number of market makers 
Market makers' position limits 
Market makers' market shares 
Market maker spread * 
21.3 per hour (every 3 minutes on average) 
1: 1 
2: 1 
1:2 
1.50% 
12 trading hours 
8 hours (8:30aln-4:30pm) 
£4.00 
6 (Dealers # 146)  
18 (#I-#2), 14 (#3-#4), and 10 (#5-#6) 
25.0% (#I-#2), 16.7%(#3-#4) and 8.3%(#5-#6) 
1.5% of share price rounded to lp  (initially 6p) 
Results. Each cell in Table 2 presents the averages of eight replications each covering 250 
days of trading in a stock. The average value for Scenario I is in the top row, and Scenarios 
I1 and 111 are below. The treatment variable is the share of institutional order flow, which is set 
at six different levels as indicated in the column headings. 
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TABLE 2
Scenario I) Market Makers trade at their discretion with midspread orders 
Scenario 11) Midspread orders are routed to a crossing system 
w Scenario 111) Midspread orders are routed to a crossing system, in which market makers can participate 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  
,,:. ,>: ::,:; :,:::,::: ...... ............................ :" ,:::,::~ ::::,:,:::: ............................ :C A:::: ,   :: : : : : 2: ................................................................................................................................. :  :::;  ' ;  2  :  : : : :;;i  : : . .r   ::   ..... : ................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  :,: .  >, ::,.: ::.:.:.: ............. :::::.:::::::::;:;;<$5:>:A:::::::2:::~:;:::::::::::~:;:52.::::fi<;~$::::;:;:2~ 
... .. .. :;;;m22s;;;;:;:;:;:;i:;;;;;;; ii;;ijs;4:; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ; : ~ c ; ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ; ; ~ ~  ::; :;:::.:.: :.:.: ... .:.:.:.:.:.?:.:.:.:<::;:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: .................................. :.:.:.: ::...:.:.:.:.:.:.:.>:.:.:.:.:.>?:.:.:.:.: .....:.......... :.:... ........................................................ :;; ............................................................................ 
::::52:t::;:::::l:;:2;:.;2;;;:::::2::::ij:i j~~:;;;:~;:z:xi3jjjjj:::;:j:;jl:;i::l:j:j:; : ............................... r t r : : S ~ A P E ~ W ~ t A R G E : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ j ~ ~ ~ ~ & ~ ~ ' j b .  T R A ~ ~ $ t t j i j i e j : ~ @ t ~ ~ - ~ Q I ~ ~ ~ i ~  ...............................  ... .. 
.................................. . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  
. . 
Means over 8 sample runs: I 0% I 7.5% ( 15% 1 30% ( 45% 1 60 % 
- Arriving orders and executed trade sides i 42.604.4 
Executed customer trade volume 298.306 (same in all settings) 
............................................... .....,. + .............................................................,........................................................... * '....................................... *............................. Scenario I) : 41 1,419 j 409,539 i 414.652 i 418.512 j 416,396 j 41 5,031 
Market maker volumes If) j 394.378 j 375.060 i 329.167 j 281.206 i 237,084 
Ill) i 389,920 i 371.040 i 325.063 j 277.301 j 232.1 90 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
Touch spread I) j 4.5p i 4.6p 11.15%) i 4.6p l1.16%1 j 4.713 (1.17%) j 4.7p 11.19%) i 4 . 8 ~  (1.20%) 
(as a % of mean price) Ill i (1.13%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) j 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) 
Ill1 i i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) i 4 . 6 ~  (1.15%) 
............................................................................................................................................... .._ ............................ ....... 
1. ..... .........*........ ........................................ 
Midspread trading as a percent of I) i 4.85% i 9.64% i 19.3% j 29.0% i 38.6% 
I11 i total customer volume na i 5.91% i 11.0% i 22.4% i 33.7% i 44.0% 
Ill) j 6.29% j 12.1% i 23.5% i 34.8% i 45.2% 
....................................................................................................................................................................... ................................................. + .............................. 
Average Cost of a Round-Trip Transaction i 
Market orders i 0.85% f 0.91% f 0.91% i 0.98% i 1.01% i 1.04% 
Midspread orders na 0.40% j 0.36% i 0.34% j 0.32% i 0.38% 
All I) f 0.85% I 0.89% f 0.86% f 0.85% f 0.81% f 0.78% 
Market orders 0.90% f 0.87% f 0.93% f 0.87% ! 0.89% 
Midspread orders 0.20% i 0.29% f 0.21% i 0.14% i 0.1 6% 
All 111 i 0.87% i 0.83% i 0.81% i 0.72% i 0.68% 
Market orders 0.91% i 0.87% i 0.85% i 0.91% i 0.95% 
Midspread orders 0.09% i 0.16% f 0.18% f 0.30% f 0.17% 
Ill, j All 0.86% i 0.81% j 0.74% i 0.75% i 0.73% 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ..... _ 
Fill rates: Percentage of I) j na : 80.1 % i 79.6% j 79.1% j 78.5% j 78.1 % 
midspread order volume completed Ill i 40.6% i 53.2% i 63.4% i 68.7% j 67.4% 
by market makers or in  a crossing 1111 i 67.2% i 73.4% i 78.5% i 80.8% j 81.2% 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .......... * ..-...... - .* 
I 1  i 1 . 4 2 ~  j 1 . 4 2 ~  j 1 . 4 3 ~  i 1 . 4 4 ~  i 1 . 4 5 ~  
Executed midspread order savings Ill i 1 . 4 0 ~  j 1 . 2 9 ~  i 1 . 3 9 ~  i 1 . 4 5 ~  i 1 .43p 
Ill1 i na i 0 . 6 1 ~  i 0 . 8 5 ~  i 1 . 0 7 ~  i 1 . 1 9 ~  i 1 . 2 7 ~  
* ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Unexecuted midspread order selec- I) i 0 . 0 0 ~  j 0 . 0 0 ~  ; 0 . 0 0 ~  j 0 . 0 0 ~  j 0 . 0 0 ~  
tion cost (midspread orders after Ill i - 0 . 1 7 ~  j - 0 . 4 8 ~  i - 0 . 3 0 ~  i - 0 . 2 6 ~  i - 0 . 4 2 ~  
3 cross tries. others after 1 try) Ill1 j - 1 . 2 3 ~  j - 0 . 7 0 ~  j - 0 . 4 4 ~  i - 0 . 3 9 ~  i - 0 . 4 4 ~  
............................................................................................................................................. .................................................................................. 1 ....................... 
I1 j 694.1 i 597.5 i 328.8 i 136.2 i -191.0 i -438.7 
Market makers' trading revenue Ill i (0.043%) i 586.8 i 628.5 i 538.8 i 531.3 i 452.7 
Ill, j 7 .  749.2 i 783.7 i 646.2 i 628.1 i 592.3 
............................................................................................-..................................... I+ ..+.-.................................................................................,............................. 
I1 i 7.0 j 7.0 i 7.0 i 7.0 i 7.0 i 7.0 
Market makers' average bargain size Ill j 6.9 i 6.8 i 6.5 i 6.2 i 5.8 
Ill) i 6.9 i 6.8 i 6.5 j 6.2 i 5.8 
I 
Empirical validation of the output data, based on several measures from the actual LSE 
market, indicates that the model provides a realistic representation. In the simulation, the 
average touch spread was 1.13 percent in the base case (no midspread orders) compared to the 
b average touch spread for FTSE 100 shares of 1.10 percent in 1992, and 0.84 percent in 1993. 
In the simulation, there were 202 customer bargains per day compared to 212 per day for a 
b FTSE 100 stock on average in 1993, and 166 per day in 1992. The average dealing margin for 
market makers in the simulation was 4.3 basis points (dealing profits t total dealer volumes), 
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or 5.9 basis points when intramarket volumes are single counted (dealing profits + total 
turnover). In a six month sample of trading in 25 FTSE 100 shares, Hansch and Neuberger 
(1993) found market maker margins to be 8.9 basis points. These figures are consistent with 
transactions cost data for U.S. equities trading from Berkowitz, Logue, and Noser (1988) who 
found in a large sample of trades that gross market maker profits were 0.06 percent, or 6 basis 
points. In the base case, investors submitting orders to the market incur round-trip transactions 
costs on average of 0.85 percent. A round-trip represents the act of buying and later selling 
during the 250 day simulated market period. Informed orders trade on difference between p* 
and the quotes. For the 16 cases considered, they sell at an average of between lop and 12p 
(2.5-3.0 percent) above their purchase price. Because market makers often improve on the touch 
prices and bear the risk of trading with the informed orders, their average dealing margin of 4.3 
basis points recovers just 4 percent of the quoted touch spread. 
Impacts of midspread orders. Four principal impacts of increasing midspread trading activity 
are evident in the results of the simulation. 
RESULT 1. Tnvestors' overall transactions costs go down as the proportion of seeking mids~read 
execution increases. Net of changes in the stock price, a round-trip using market orders pays 
a cost due to the spread between bid and offer prices. Conditional on executing both the buy 
and sell legs, a round-trip transaction using midspread orders will not have a cost, i.e., they will 
buy and sell at the same price on average. Notice that an 80 percent fill rate (Row 6 in Table 
2) implies the probability of executing both sides of the transaction with midspread orders is just 
(.80)2 = 64 percent.6 Round-trip transactions costs are the weighted average of the transactions 
cost of using market orders weighted by market orders' proportion of turnover and the 
transactions cost of using midspread orders weighted by midspread orders' proportion of 
turnover. Informed orders are not included. The average cost of a round-trip decreases from 
0.85 % of trade value to 0.78% when 60 percent of large orders are midspread orders. The cost 
Fill rates of actual crossing systems in use in the U.S. are about 10 to 20 percent. The fill rates are higher 
in the simulation because the model's largest order size is 25, o r  about 3% times the average order size. Crossing 
systems in use attract orders that are often far larger than the average. Hence, relative to the model, they have high 
submitted volumes (i.e., the denominator in the fill rate equation) compared to what crosses (i.e., the numerator). 
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falls to 0.68% when the crossing system is available, and 0.73 % when market maker participate 
in the crossings. Market makers' participation in the crossing system reduces round-trip costs 
for low percentages of midspread orders. At higher levels of order submissions, however, 
dealers in the crossing raise investors' costs. 
GRAPH 1: ROUND-TRIP TRANSACTIONS COST (% OF TRADE VALUE) FOR CUSTOMER ORDERS 
O.QO0/n T 
( I )  Market makers 
accommodate 
- 
(11) Investor-only 
crossings \ 
I , 0.65% 4 I I I I I i 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution 
As a corollary, dealer margins fall at higher levels of midspread trading. In Scenario I, total 
dealer profits fall from 4.3 basis points to -2.7 basis points when midspread orders are 60 
percent of the large order flow. (See Graph 5) This raises the questions how dealers will 
respond to lower margins if they accommodate midspread trading, or how they will respond to 
smaller volumes if a crossing systems draws order flow away. Widening spreads on the 
remaining market orders could drive more investors to use a crossing system. 
RESULT 2. To be effective. a crossing svstem must achieve a critical mass of activitv. Without 
a significant proportion of the eligible orders entered into the crossing system, it will not provide 
execution rates (executed volume in crossing + submitted volume) that are comparable to what 
market makers would provide by dealing at the midspread on request. For the conditions 
examined here, the hurdle is at about 30 percent of order flow (Graph 2) when market makers 
participate. In actual markets, there is no reliable estimate of what proportion of investor orders 
use passive trading methods, but crossing system use in the U.S. is growing and could soon 
approach critical mass. 
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GRAPH 2: FILL RATES ON CUSTOMER MIDSPREAD ORDERS 
j 
i 
(11) Investor-only crossings : ! 
i 
I 
j 
I I I I 
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Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution 
Reaching critical mass in U.K. equities could be hampered by a pattern of market maker 
response that impedes development of liquidity on a disintermediated system. By sacrificing 
some of their dealing margins and trading with passive traders at "midspread" prices as in 
Scenario I, market makers will retain order flow from investors who will find little advantage 
from the crossing system at submission levels. If the crossing volumes remain low, fill rates 
will remain unattractive. 
RESULT 3. Selection cost risk exists in passive crossing systems. Orders that do not complete 
promptly in a crossing system eventually execute at prices that may be worse than those 
available for immediate execution at the time the order was submitted. Graphs 3a and 3b 
indicate the execution price a midspread order achieves compared to the price it would have 
received from a market maker at the time it entered the crossing system. In all cases, orders 
that cross in the first auction after they are entered save about 2p. Orders that are filled in their 
second attempt at crossing save about l p  if the crossing system excludes market makers, but give 
up a half-penny if market makers participate. The selection cost grows to as much as 8p for 
orders that are unfilled in the auction after three attempts, and the residuals revert to a SEAQ 
market maker for execution. Adverse selection occurs because-the lack of a contra side in the 
crossing indicates that the short-term price movement is likely to work against the passive 
trader's order. As Graph 3b indicates, the selection cost effect is intensified by the presence of 
market makers in the auction. Dealers are likely to be on the unfilled side of the market and 
adjust their quotes after the auction against the unsatisfied client orders from the auction. 
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Although dealing revenues are greater when market makers take part in the crossings, their 
participation has the effect of increasing the system's execution rate. In part, the revenue 
increase is due to the reduction in the market makers' average bargain size when the crossing 7 
system operates (Row 10 in Table 2). Large trades in  the model are higher risk and less 
profitable for market makers because they often lead to the dealers raising or lowering quotes 
in the absence of a shift in p*. The crossing system executes many of the large orders, leaving 
the market makers with smaller orders that are more profitable on average. 
GRAPH 5 :  MARKET MAKER DEALING REVENUE (AVERAGES OVER 250 SIMULATED TRADING DAYS) 
(Ill) Market makers participate 
(11) Investor-only crossings 
0 (200) -- (I) Market makers accommodate 
(400) -- midspread orders 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution 
Conclusions. Fund management has been transformed by new portfolio strategies, and 
innovative market and trading technology, The alternative trading mechanisms available today 
threaten many established stock exchanges and their traditional intermediaries. We presented 
a model of London's market operations, and assessed three alternative scenarios. The results 
indicate that changes in investor behavior and new trading alternatives will have profound effects 
on the market and LSE member firms. Trading costs will fall, but market maker volumes and 
profitability may come under attack. Equity investing, however, is made more attractive by 
B 
reducing the round-trip transactions costs paid by the average investor. Several questions 
remain: if dealers attempt to recover profitability by widening spreads, will that spur even more 
8 
disintermediated trading and bypass of the Exchange market? Will market makers support the 
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GRAPHS 3~ AND 38: EXECUTION COST SAVINGS COMPARED TO IMMEDIACY 
3.0 T (11) Investor-only crossings 3.0 T (III) Market makers participate 
15.0% 30.0% 45.0% 60.0% 15.0% 30.0% 45.0% 60.0% 
Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution 
Most orders execute in the first crossing (Graph 4), and the average execution cost for 
midspread orders reflects a saving compared to immediate execution with a market maker (Row 
7 in Table 2). An order entered into the crossing, however, faces uncertainty about its eventual 
execution price. This helps to explain why investors are often willing to pay for immediacy. 
GRAPH 4: CROSSING VOLUME BY CROSS NUMBER 
I I I 
7.5% 15.0% 30.0% 45.0% 60.0% 7.5% 15.0% 30.0% 45.0% 60.0% 
Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution 
RESULT 4. Dealing marpins improve when market makers submit excess positions to the 
crossing svstem. and market makers will choose to participate when offered the choice. 
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e Although dealing revenues are greater when market makers take part in the crossings, their 
participation has the effect of increasing the system's execution rate. In part, the revenue 
increase is due to the reduction in the market makers' average bargain size when the crossing 
system operates (Row 10 in Table 2). Large trades in the model are higher risk and less 
profitable for market makers because they often lead to the dealers raising or lowering quotes 
in the absence of a shift in p*. The crossing system executes many of the large orders, leaving 
the market makers with smaller orders that are more profitable on average. 
GRAPH 5 :  MARKET MAKER DEALING REVENUE (AVERAGES OVER 250 SIMULATED TRADING DAYS) 
(Ill) Market makers participate 
- 800 - 4 \ in crossings 
(11) Investor-only crossings 
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Eligible Orders Seeking Midspread Execution 
Conclusions. Fund management has been transformed by new portfolio strategies, and 
innovative market and trading technology. The alternative trading mechanisms available today 
threaten many,established stock exchanges and their traditional intermediaries. We presented 
a model of London's market operations, and assessed three alternative scenarios. The results 
indicate that changes in investor behavior and new trading alternatives will have profound effects 
on the market and LSE member firms. Trading costs will fall, but market maker volumes and 
0 profitability may come under attack. Equity investing, however, is made more attractive by 
reducing the round-trip transactions costs paid by the average investor. Several questions 
s remain: if dealers attempt to recover profitability by widening spreads, will that spur even more 
disintermediated trading and bypass of the Exchange market? Will market makers support the 
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costs of price discovery when they handle a diminished proportion of trading volume? Finally, a 
what proportion of investors will eventually use passive trading methods? 
v 
The model can provide a basis for making objective judgments about market structure 
and policy choices. A shortcoming of the LSE may be its traditional support for an 
intermediated, competing dealer mechanism for trading at a time when alternative investment 
management approaches are flourishing, and trading needs exhibit growing variation. A 
competing market maker system is suited to some, but not all, investors' strategies. Keeping 
order flow from deserting an exchange may require augmenting the market structure with 
alternative, lower-cost trading mechanisms. Similar proposal have been made in the U.S. 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1985) The exchange's best response may be to preempt these 
alternatives by offering a range of linked trading mechanisms (Figure 4), including competing 
SEAQ market maker quotes, limit order facilities, and periodic crossings. 
FIGURE 4: RESPONDING WITH AN INTEGRATED HYBRID MARKET STRUCTURE 
Traditional LSE Market: 
Id U I 
Integrated mechanisms and investor control: 
While it provides useful comparisons between several alternative situations, the model 
has several limitations. Left out are investors' responses to market conditions. For instance, 
the proportions of liquidity, momentum, information, and midspread orders could change over 
time or as a result of market conditions. The model represents trading in a single security. 
Market participants usually do not consider a security in isolation; market makers cover several 
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stocks and investors manage portfolios of securities. In some cases, the risk of a dealer's 
4 
position could be greatly reduced by an offsetting position in a related security. Finally, some 
I 
of the input parameters that are assumed to be constant - such as volatility and order arrival 
rates - could be affected by changes in trading and investor behavior. For developing an 
understanding of the impacts of alternative trading systems, however, the limitations are fairly 
minor, and we find our general results on the impact of passive investing and disintermediated 
trading to be robust to broad variation in the model's input parameters. Crossing systems may 
soon grow out of their early stages of development. At that time, the pace of adoption is likely 
to quicken, and market participants unprepared for the growing disintermediation of trading will 
face difficulties and worsening performance. 
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